developing countries, the focus has been on the level of inflation beyond which growth falters. When inflation rose rapidly as a global phenomenon in mid-2007, there were concerns that it was reaching high levels that, if uncontained, would undermine growth by raising inflationary expectations. Consequently, a policy priority for many countries was to head off inflationary pressures while preserving growth. For advanced economies, which have much lower inflation thresholds, the focus was on maintaining very low levels of inflation to sustain macroeconomic stability. Citing the twin risks of deflation and near zero nominal interest rates, a recent study challenged this view, arguing that higher targets for inflation (and resulting higher nominal interest rates) would leave more room to reduce nominal and real interest rates during crises and allow for stronger monetary stimulus (Blanchard, Dell'Ariccia, and Mauro 2010) .
Motivated by this experience and by the renewed discussion of the optimal level of inflation, this article uses a logistic smooth transition regression model (LSTR; see Terä svirta 1994 , and van Dijk, Terä svirta, and Franses 2002 to revisit the relationship between inflation and growth. It augments the literature in several ways: estimating the speed of transition from one regime (low effect of inflation on growth) to another (high effect on growth), using bootstrap techniques to validate the precision of the estimates and Monte Carlo experiments to investigate the performance of LSTR in estimating thresholds and speeds of transition, distinguishing among advanced economies, developing economies, and oil exporters, and extending the estimation period and increasing the number of countries.
The estimated threshold is about 10 percent for most of the country groups (except for the advanced economies). This rate is in line with many of the estimates in the literature, although several papers have suggested higher thresholds (around 20 percent for developing economies). The speed of transition is fairly high, which implies that inflation is harmful to growth soon after it exceeds the threshold. Monte Carlo experiments reveal that although the LSTR estimator provides some useful additional degrees of freedom in the estimation, the distinction between the LSTR and a more standard TAR model is not crucial because of the rapid speed of transition from one regime to another.
The accuracy of the estimates is validated using bootstrapping techniques-providing, to the best of our knowledge, new robustness checks in the inflation-growth literature. These techniques also help explain the range of estimates found in the literature to be reflective of the natural variation inherent in the cross-country data as well as of the estimation technique. Although the bootstrapping exercises suggest that the value of the threshold is robust to outliers, the range of bootstrap estimates is almost as large as the range of estimates in the literature. For instance, for developing countries, the estimated inflation threshold lies between 7 percent and 13 percent for around 90 percent of the bootstrapped sample. Furthermore, the results indicate that inflation is more costly for oil exporters than for the other country groups if the dependent variable is nonoil GDP growth (as opposed to total GDP growth).
Section I discusses previous inflationary episodes, as context for the volatility of inflation surrounding the recent global recession, and summarizes the policy measures taken around the world to fight overheating in 2007 and 2008 . Section II reviews the related academic literature. Section III identifies a threshold model for the relationship between inflation and growth, and presents the results and robustness checks to the model. Section IV presents implications of the findings.
I . T H E B A C K D R O P
Since the late 1960s, expansionary fiscal policies and accommodative monetary policies have contributed to a strong cyclical upswing in the global economy, creating supply-demand imbalances in many nonfuel primary commodities (table 1) . Capacity constraints were already putting upward pressure on wages and prices, but the oil price shock of 1973 boosted an inflation surge, with inflation reaching double digits in many industrial countries (including Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Developing countries (and oil importers) were affected even more.
Meanwhile, falling real interest rates during the 1970s gave another boost to aggregate demand, further stoking inflation. In the 1980s and 1990s, during the period dubbed the Great Moderation, inflation declined steadily, especially among advanced economies. Although the interpretation is not definitive, economists have attributed part of the improvements in the macroeconomic environment to stronger monetary policy (Bernanke 2004) .
The 2006-08 rapid increase in headline inflation was driven mostly by food and energy prices. Broadly speaking, the global economy faced three types of underlying inflationary impulses. First, a number of countries-including several in emerging Europe-faced a combination of strong capital inflows, rapid credit growth, tightening labor markets, and widening current account deficits, all evidence of overheating. Second, many commodity-exporting countries, including members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Russian (Figure 1 ). With mixed results, countries used a combination of monetary, trade, and fiscal measures to counter inflationary pressures, depending on whether countries were commodity exporters (especially fuel) or importers. Some governments resorted to price and quantity controls on imports and exports, using administered prices, subsidies, and buffer stocks. Countries with flexible exchange rate regimes used a combination of monetary and fiscal policies. Countries with pegged or relatively fixed exchange rate regimes depended more on fiscal policy, efforts to increase productive capacity, and prudential measures to rein in inflation.
In 2009, fuel prices plummeted some 40 percent and food prices declined almost 15 percent. With global demand squeezed, world inflation of 2.5 percent was less than half its 2008 peak of 6 percent. By the end of 2010, the average annual inflation rate over the period 2005-10 had shrunk to around 7.5 percent for food and fuel, but accommodating monetary policies around the world and sustained energy and food inflation in 2010 have rekindled worries of inflationary risks (and growth concerns) in regions that recovered fastest from the world recession. 
I I . A R E V I E W O F T H E L I T E R A T U R E
Research on the inflation-growth nexus has addressed three key questions: Is there a robust negative relationship between inflation and growth? Is there an optimal level of inflation, and what definition of inflation should be targeted? Is there a kink in the relationship, so that the relationship is positive at very low levels of inflation (perhaps due to Phillips curve effects) and negative at higher levels, and does the kink occur at similar levels in industrial and developing economies?
The Keynesian view of a static tradeoff between inflation and growth dominated the literature on inflation until the stagflation episode in the 1970s elevated Friedman's view that the tradeoff could exist only in the short term. In the long run, the Phillips curve is vertical because agents form rational expectations on inflation. Neo-Keynesian models have synthesized these short-and longterm effects using rational expectation models with sticky prices in economies with monopolistic competition. In the long run, activity depends only on factors of production, but in the short run inflation surprises can increase production because inflation affects relative prices for companies that cannot reset prices immediately.
The long-run supply curve with respect to inflation may even slope backwards because of the effect of inflation on uncertainty: high inflation increases macroeconomic uncertainty because it is unclear to the private sector whether policymakers will want to face the costs of disinflation (Ball 1992) . Uncertainty, in turn, reduces investment and growth because there is an option value to waiting when the investment decision is irreversible (McDonald and Siegel 1986) . Changes in relative prices also create distortions in the production structure, and as a result the welfare effect of inflation is negative.
In most dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, optimal inflation is zero or lower (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2004). However, optimal inflation is positive if nominal wages cannot be decreased, since inflation then allows for downward adjustments in real wages when needed (Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry 1996) . Indeed, central banks in many advanced countries adopted (explicitly or implicitly) inflation targets of about 2 percent. The debate on the optimal level of inflation was revived following the proposal by Blanchard, Dell'Ariccia, and Mauro (2010) that central banks increase their inflation targets from 2 percent to 4 percent. This proposal arose from the observation that central banks in many countries with low inflation and low interest rates had been unable to reduce nominal (and thus real) interest rates as much as needed to fight the Great Recession. Raising the inflation target from 2 percent to 4 percent was seen as reducing the probability of hitting the zero-bound of the interest rate (Reifschneider and Williams 2000; Billi and Kahn 2008) . From a policy perspective, it was assumed that central banks could also affect expected inflation rates and therefore reduce real rates without moving nominal rates (Eggertsson and Woodford 2003) . However, such a policy would require committing to higher inflation in the future, and this proved difficult in the 2009 crisis as central bankers worried about the effect on the credibility of the monetary authority.
With food and fuel prices driving recent inflationary episodes, the debate also extended to the appropriate definition of inflation (core or headline). In DSGE models, inflation is costly because of the relative price distortions created when prices are sticky. But food and fuel prices are less sticky than the other components in the CPI and therefore contribute less to these distortions. Consequently, targeting core inflation may be optimal (Aoki 2001) . However, this argument ignores the effects that food and fuel price inflation might have in models with other frictions. In contrast, Anand and Prasad (2010) argue that food price shocks affect inflation expectations because households cannot hedge against these shocks and cannot factor food prices into wage bargaining. As a result, targeting headline inflation, with some weight given to the output gap, is optimal. This argument could be especially important for developing countries, where food accounts for a large fraction of household expenditure and financial constraints ( preventing hedging) are tighter. Catã o and Chang (2010) offer a similar argument and show that targeting headline inflation is optimal when food price volatility is high.
A starting point for answering the empirical question on the kink in the inflation-growth relationship is identifying the threshold beyond which inflation has a negative effect on growth. Ideally, inflation thresholds should be estimated for each country, incorporating country-specific characteristics. Nevertheless, studies have relied mostly on panel techniques, because the relationship between inflation and growth is likely to be stronger at low frequencies, and the data rarely cover more than 40 years. However, measuring the threshold level of inflation in a cross-country framework runs the risk that extreme values will influence the results, since samples typically include countries with inflation as low as 1 percent and as high as 200 percent.
Empirical studies have found a significant statistical relationship between inflation and growth, even after controlling for fiscal performance, wars, droughts, population growth, openness, and even human and physical capital and allowing for simultaneity bias. Among studies using a time series approach, Mubarik (2005) analyzed data on Pakistan for 1973-2005 and found that although inflation below 5 percent has a positive impact on economic growth, inflation above 9 percent depresses growth. Rangarajan (1997) , working with Indian data, suggested a range of 5 percent to 7 percent, a result confirmed by Samantaraya and Prasad (2001) , who estimated the threshold at 6.5 percent.
Studies based on panel estimates have produced mixed results. Based on a cross-country regression of 101 countries over 1960 -89, Fischer (1993 found that high inflation retards the growth of output by reducing investment and the productivity growth rate. Using different panels, Barro (1995 Barro ( , 2001 ) and Bruno and Easterly (1996) noticed that the negative effect of inflation on growth was significant only when high-inflation episodes were included in the sample. Using annual data for 87 countries over 1970 -90, Sarel (1996 found evidence of a structural break at an 8 percent inflation rate. Inflation and growth are positively correlated below 8 percent but negatively correlated above that, suggesting that ignoring this nonlinearity would significantly underestimate the impact of inflation on growth. Ghosh and Philips (1998) found that although inflation and growth are positively correlated at very low inflation rates (of 2 -3 percent a year), the relationship is reversed at higher rates. Furthermore, the relationship is convex, so that the decline in growth associated with an increase in inflation from 10 percent to 20 percent is much larger than that associated with an increase from 40 percent to 50 percent. Khan and Senhadji (2001) reexamined this result and found a significant threshold effect that differed for industrial and developing countries. Their study, based on a panel of 140 countries over 1960-98, established a threshold above which inflation significantly slows growth of 1 -3 percent for industrial countries and 7-11 percent for developing countries. Using a panel of 138 countries, Drukker, Gomis-Porqueras, and Hernandez-Verme (2005) confirmed the existence of a threshold, but they estimated its level to be higher, at about 19 percent. This threshold level, higher than usually estimated, was also found by Pollin and Zhu (2006) . A much lower threshold was obtained by Burdekin and others (2004) , who estimated a panel model on 72 countries using annual data and, after allowing for multiple thresholds, found that inflation is costly for developing countries when it is higher than 3 percent. They also identified a second break at 50 percent, above which marginal growth costs decreases by 25 percent.
This section presents the results of the LSTR model and of Monte Carlo experiments analyzing the difference between the LSTR model and a TAR model.
The LSTR Model
The Khan and Senhadji (2001) model is extended by estimating the link between inflation and GDP growth using a panel of 165 countries over 1960-2007 and allowing both for a smooth transition model and a convex relationship above (and below) the threshold. The explanatory variable is a logarithmic function of inflation. In line with the growth literature, data were averaged over five-year periods 1 to smooth business cycle fluctuations, and controls were included for the other determinants of growth (see below). The following 1. The time dimension of the data is therefore nine periods of nonoverlapping five-year averages. This prevents any moving-average dynamics that would be generated by using annual data of five-year moving averages.
LSTR model was estimated:
where y is the logarithm of GDP and X a vector of control variables. The function f( p), where p is annual inflation expressed in percentage points, is used to model the effect of inflation on growth (figure 2). The choice of a logarithmic function rather than a linear function such as f( p) ¼ p enables capturing the fact that multiplicative shocks in inflation have similar effects on growth for any initial level of inflation. For instance, in a linear model, an increase in inflation from 10 percent to 20 percent would have the same effect on growth as an increase from 50 percent to 60 percent. In a multiplicative (logarithmic) model, an increase from 10 percent to 20 percent inflation would have the same effect as an increase from 50 percent to 100 percent.
FIGURE 2. Explanatory Variable f( p), as a Function of p
Source: Authors' calculations based on model described in text.
2. A constant was added in the logarithmic function to smooth the distribution of f(p) around zero. The distribution for f(p) in the data was almost symmetric (skewness at 0.9).
The explanatory variable f( p) enters the model through two regressors-W low (f( p)-f(c*)) and W high (f(p)-f(c*))-to capture the possibility that a different b should be used for different levels of inflation. The parameter c* can be interpreted as the level of inflation above which the parameters of the upper regime dominate and below which the parameters of the lower regime dominate. In particular, † If inflation is very low, the effect of inflation on growth is represented by b low only (since W high ¼ 0-see figure 3-and therefore W low ¼ 1). † If inflation is very high, the effect of inflation on growth will be represented mainly by b high (since W high ¼ 1 when inflation is high).
More generally, when inflation is above c* the impact on growth is nearer b high , and when inflation is below c* the impact on growth is nearer b low . When inflation is in the neighborhood of c*, the actual effect of inflation on growth is given by a weighted average of b low and b high , where the weights are given by W high , as plotted in figure 3, and W low ¼ 1-W high . When inflation is equal to c*,
The parameter g* captures the speed of transition from one regime to another. So that the value of g* can be compared across models, it is divided by the standard deviation of f( p it ). Even if inflation is above the threshold (say inflation is 13 percent and the estimated threshold is 10 percent), the effect of inflation on growth may not be strongly negative when g* is low (for example, g* ¼ 3 in figure 3 ), since it will be captured by 0.33
3. All the calculations and figure 3 are computed with standard deviation ¼ 1 in line with the overall sample statistics.
The estimation of g* is important in the LSTR model: the policy implications of a high g* would be that inflation pressures have to be tackled as a priority because inflation becomes immediately costly. The standard threshold model used in the literature assumes that g* ! 1 and, therefore, is unable to determine how quickly to worry about high inflation.
When c* and g* are known, the model collapses to a linear model and can be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). The model is therefore estimated by searching for the c* and g* that minimize the concentrated sum of the squared errors (maximize the fit) of the OLS model. It is important, however, to test that equation (1) is an appropriate specification of the data and in particular that the nonlinearity in the relationship between inflation and growth can be captured by exactly two regimes. 4 If there is only one regime (no nonlinearities), the transition parameters are not identified, and if there are more than two regimes, the model is misspecified. The tests proposed by Gonzá lez, Terä svirta, and van Dijk (2005) for panel models with heteroskedastic errors are applied to test for the existence of nonlinearities and determine the number of regimes. 5 The literature surveyed in section II has not tackled this issue as only two-regime threshold models were assumed and estimated, and heteroskedasticity was not taken into account. The technical details on the estimation of the LSTR model and the specification tests are in the appendix.
The LSTR model is estimated using several control variables as determinants of growth: the ratio of investment to GDP, population growth, initial GDP, the rate of change in terms of trade, and variability in terms of trade. Since investment is included as an explanatory variable, the total effect of inflation on growth could be biased by the correlation between inflation and investment. To check for this, a model without investment is estimated, and the effect of inflation on investment and indirectly on growth is also attributed to inflation. Further, because the model controls for population growth rather than employment growth (owing to data availability), the effect of inflation on labor force participation and structural unemployment is implicitly included in the computed costs of inflation. Time dummy variables control for world business cycles, and country dummy variables capture country-specific characteristics.
Results
The results for the baseline specification are presented in table 2. The model is estimated for all countries in the data set (columns 1 -3) and for several country groups as defined by the International Monetary Fund (see the statistical appendix in IMF 2008), including advanced economies (columns 4-6), developing economies (columns 7-9), a group of oil producers (columns 4. In the typical smooth transition autoregressive model, it is common to follow a modeling process of testing for linearity against logistic and exponential nonlinearity, searching for the best-fit transition lag, and undertaking misspecification tests for remaining nonlinearities and variance reduction (Leon and Najarian 2005) .
5. The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting these specification tests.
TAB L E 2 . Ordinary Least Squares, Threshold Regression, and Logistic Smooth Transition Regression Results
All countries
Advanced economies 10-12), and all oil producers for which nonoil GDP data were available (columns 13-15). The results identify a threshold inflation of about 9 percent for the entire sample of 165 countries. The coefficient b high for the variable W high (f( p) -f(c*)) is significant. (The standard errors are heteroskedastic-robust, conditioned on the value of the LSTR or TAR parameters in the estimation. Bootstrapping results are discussed below.) When inflation is above 9 percent, a doubling of inflation decreases GDP by 0.7 percentage point a year (table 3). The order of magnitude of the estimate is in line with that of Khan and Senhadji (2001) , who use a discrete threshold model and the same control variables. The full sample estimate in the current study is driven by the developing country data and produces almost identical results to those for the full panel.
For the advanced economies group, the nonlinearity test does not reject the null hypothesis of linearity (against the logistic nonlinear alternative), and the linear specification cannot be ruled out. Indeed, the threshold obtained is the lowest allowed by the estimation algorithm, 6 and the coefficient in the OLS model is similar to that of the LSTR or TAR for inflation above the transition parameter. In any case, the difference between OLS and a nonlinear relationship with a threshold at 1 percent is not statistically or economically meaningful. Inflation was above 1 percent (for a five-year average) for 95 percent of observations for advanced economies over the sample, and aiming at inflation rates below 1 percent would pose serious deflation risks. Nevertheless, the model and the nonlinearity test do provide a result for advanced economies: higher inflation hurts growth in the medium term, for any reasonable initial level of inflation.
For the group of oil-exporting countries, the nonlinearity test does not reject the linearity assumption in this model, which implies that the threshold parameter is not identified (this is also what the bimodal bootstrapping distribution suggests; see below). In particular, since GDP numbers may be contaminated by the importance of oil production in real GDP, the model is also estimated using nonoil GDP data for all countries for which the data are available. The results become meaningful, and the effect of inflation is strong: the threshold is 13 percent, and a doubling of inflation from higher than 13 percent lowers real nonoil GDP 2.7 percent a year. Although the data are not available to investigate the cause of this finding, it could be either because the nonprimary commodity sector is more sensitive to inflation (since production in the primary sector tends to depend on other elements such as international prices and production capacity)-in which case the finding would be relevant to a varied range of countries-or because the structure differs for the 6. For the advanced economies group, there are only 12 observations with inflation below 1 percent, which means that the estimate may not be robust. To check for robustness, the search was narrowed to inflation above 2 percent, and 2 percent was also found to minimize the concentrated sum of squares for the TAR and 3 percent for the LSTR (with a very low speed of transition). The nonlinearity test again did not reject the linearity hypothesis. economies for which data are available (countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia).
The LSTR model provides fairly high estimates of g*. This implies that when starting from a level of inflation of 10 percent, an increase in inflation is more costly than would be case with a much smaller speed of transition (compare columns a and b in table 3).
7 Overall, the LSTR models confirm that inflation tends to be costly quickly, which means that inflation has to be tackled sooner rather than later. Since this result suggests that the discrete TAR model might also be a good-albeit simplified-model of the relationship between inflation and growth, TAR models are also estimated as a check, and the results are comparable. The heteroskedastic-robust Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests for remaining nonlinearities also suggest that there is no need for additional nonlinearities in equation 1.
Statistical Inference through Bootstrapping
Statistical inference was performed using bootstrapping (500 iterations) and taking into account the panel structure of the data (each random selection corresponds to a panel, not to an individual observation). The results are presented for all country groups (figures 4 -6), but since the bootstrapping exercise is computed under the hypothesis of nonlinearity, it is unlikely to be valid for advanced economies and for oil producers when real total GDP is used. Source: Authors' calculations based on data described in text.
7. The exception is for the group of oil producers, for which the LSTR is clearly not a correct specification.
The bootstrapping exercises suggest that the results are robust for advanced economies, for developing economies, and for oil producers when nonoil real GDP is used. The distribution of the thresholds is concentrated around the base estimates. For developing economies, the estimated inflation threshold lies between 7 percent and 13 percent for more than 90 percent of the bootstrapped sample. For advanced economies, although the mode of the distribution is at 1 percent, the inflation threshold is found to be lower than
FIGURE 5. Bootstrapping for Oil Producing Developing Economies
Source: Authors' calculations based on data described in text.
5 percent in only 43 percent of the bootstrapped samples and lower than 18 percent in 75 percent of the samples.
When total GDP is used as the dependent variable for oil exporters, both the TAR and the LSTR estimations are not robust (there seem to be two potential "modes" for the distribution of the threshold), likely because the LSTR model is not identified when there are no nonlinearities or because there are several outliers. This result confirms that the estimated LSTR model in table 2, column 12, is misleading.
8 When nonoil real GDP (for which linearity was not clearly rejected) is used, the threshold estimate of around 13 percent is robust, roughly in line with the one found for the developing countries group. The bootstrapping exercise confirms that the effect of higher inflation on nonoil growth is stronger for oil producing developing countries than for the other developing countries.
Overall, it is noteworthy that although the coefficients linking growth and inflation at low levels of inflation are not consistently significantly different from zero, the relationship between growth and inflation at high levels of inflation is almost always negative. This confirms the importance of nonlinearities and the negative relationship between high inflation and growth.
Robustness Checks
Several other specifications were estimated to test for the robustness of these results (table 4). The main lesson of the robustness checks is that when the Gonzá lez, Terä svirta, and van Dijk (2005) test rejects nonlinearity, the estimates are robust to different specifications. This is the case for the model estimated on the whole sample and for the model estimated on developing countries. However, when the test does not reject linearity (for advanced economies and oil producers when total GDP is used), estimates of the transition parameters are not as robust.
The first robustness check consists of dropping the investment share of GDP variable, to assess the indirect effect of inflation on growth through investment. The transition parameters and slope coefficients are mostly unchanged for the groups for which the linearity assumption was rejected. For advanced economies, the 1 percent threshold estimated in the baseline is now estimated at 6 percent, but the Gonzá lez, Terä svirta, and van Dijk (2005) test is again unable to reject the linearity hypothesis.
A second check estimates the model with the square root of inflation instead of the logarithm of inflation (see table 4). 9 The LSTR transition parameters c* are lower by 1 or 2 percentage points in this square-root specification, but the difference is within the error bands suggested by the bootstrapping exercise. The estimates, at 11 percent and with g* ¼ 6, are also very similar for the whole sample and for developing countries when only the subsample of post-1990 data are selected for all countries. Similarly, the cost of inflation for growth is also of the same order of magnitude. For the advanced economies, the model seems misspecified, as the linearity assumption is again not rejected.
8. As a result, the very low g is not robust either-there is a very strong negative correlation between g and c.
9. Twenty periods of very high inflation (with rates exceeding 150 percent a year on average for five years) were dropped as they strongly affected that estimation. 
(8) All the models are identified using the assumption that over the medium term (the variables are expressed as nonoverlapping five-year averages) the causality runs from inflation to growth, a common assumption in the growth-inflation literature (the OLS assumption). To check for the robustness of the results to the endogeneity of inflation, growth is regressed on lagged inflation (which is unlikely to be caused by future growth), as opposed to contemporaneous inflation. The lagged investment to GDP ratio was also used for the same reason. The dataset was generated as nonoverlapping three year averages for this exercise, to keep the relationship meaningful. The threshold estimates were again similar for the whole sample and slightly higher (at 17 percent) for developing countries, confirming that this estimation is robust to potential endogeneity of inflation.
However, the Gonzá lez, Terä svirta, and van Dijk (2005) test does not reject linearity for the subgroups of developing countries and of oil producers: at the three-year frequency and using past inflation, the nonlinearity is not strong enough to reject the linear model. For the full sample, the linearity assumption is marginally rejected at the 15 percent level, and the inflation threshold is about 12 percent, with a very high speed of transition. In addition, the effect of high inflation is weaker using lagged inflation than using contemporaneous inflation. The bootstrapping exercise (see figure 6 ) confirms that the LSTR parameters are well estimated, with the mode of the distribution being at 11 percent for the threshold inflation. The coefficient on inflation is negative in more than 95 percent of the bootstrapping iterations, and the mode of this distribution is -0.006. The TAR model yields similar threshold and coefficient distributions.
TAR or LSTR: A Monte Carlo Analysis
Monte Carlo experiments were run to analyze the difference between the LSTR model with a reasonably low g* (g* ¼ 6) and one with an infinite g* (a TAR model). The Monte Carlo simulations consist of generating artificial data from the low-g* LSTR model (equation 1), using the actual estimates of the parameters of the model (g*, c*, and the standard error of the model) for the different groups, and then estimating a TAR model. The reverse experiment is also performed: artificial data are generated using the TAR model parameters and employed to estimate a LSTR model.
The results show that the LSTR estimation procedure is good at capturing the value of the threshold, as well as the negative sign of the b high coefficient (figure 7). However, the b low coefficient is not statistically different from zero. And the LSTR often estimates g to be lower than its true value: for a TAR, the estimate should be g* ! 1, which is approximated by g* ! 15, but this happens only 25 percent of the time. For the converse exercise (when a LSTR model is simulated with a low g* and estimated as a TAR), the TAR model does not significantly bias the threshold estimate. It also yields a significantly negative coefficient for b high . Of course, the TAR cannot be used to evaluate the size of g*. Motivated by the global inflation episode of 2007 and recent discussions of the optimal level of inflation that followed heightened risks of deflation and of a liquidity trap, this article revisits the inflation-growth nexus. A smooth transition model is used to investigate the speed at which inflation beyond a threshold becomes harmful to growth, an important consideration in the policy response to rising inflation as the world economy recovers. For a panel of 165 countries over 1960-2007, estimates find that for developing countries inflation above a threshold of about 10 percent quickly becomes harmful to growth, suggesting the need for a prompt policy response to inflation at or above that threshold. For the advanced economies, there is no evidence that a specific threshold effect is at play: any level of inflation hurts growth. For oil exporting countries, the estimates are less robust, but the threshold is again estimated to be about 10 percent. The effect of higher inflation for oil producers is also stronger than for other developing countries.
The impact on growth of core and headline inflation could not be distinguished because of a lack of data. This is an important area for further research. To the extent that core inflation is better anticipated and less volatile than headline or the noncore component of inflation, core inflation is likely to have less impact on agents' price-setting behavior and on long-term growth. Also, with policymakers' reactions more predictable for core inflation than for headline inflation, core inflation would likely create less macroeconomic uncertainty (Ball 1992) . On the other hand, food and fuel inflation is likely to affect growth more strongly and at lower levels than is core inflation. Policymakers' reactions to food and fuel inflation are less predictable-food and fuel inflation is generally more volatile, hurts the poor disproportionately, and affects subsidies and government balances. Since the food and fuel components of inflation are more exogenous to policy, especially in developing countries, the best route to reducing the costs of inflation may well be to increase the flexibility of markets and develop insurance mechanisms.
Another potential area for research is explaining the difference in thresholds and speed of transitions among the advanced, developing, and oil producing economies using factors such as measures of financial friction and financial development, production structure, and absorptive capacity.
A P P E N D I X
The model described in equation (1) is estimated using the standard nonlinear least squares method (see Chan 1993) . If g* and c* were known, the model would collapse to a simpler formulation: The solution (c*, g*) is found through a simple grid search algorithm that scrolls through all potential vectors (c*, g*) of natural numbers in f1, . . . ,100g Â f1, . . . ,15g. The search for g* stops at 15 as the transition functions for g .14 are in practice indistinguishable. Periods of severe recession-when losses were higher than 5 percent of GDP per year over five years-are excluded from the data. These episodes correspond to the breakup of the Soviet Union (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation during 1990-94), 1990-94 in Angola, and 1960-64 in Argentina and Taiwan, China.
Gonzá lez, Terä svirta, and van Dijk (2005) propose several specification tests of the model. 10 The first is a test for the existence of nonlinearities-a test that g* ¼ 0 (in which case the model collapses to a linear model as W high ¼ W low ). The test is nonstandard because under the null hypothesis H0: g* ¼ 0, the parameters c* and b high are not identified. The problem of hypothesis testing in this context was first studied by Davies (1977) and applied by Hansen (1999) in the panel context. The solution proposed by Gonzá lez, Terä svirta, and van Dijk, following Luukkonen, Saikkonen, and Terä svirta (1988) , is to replace W high by its Taylor series approximation around g* ¼ 0. The following short presentation is taken from Gonzá lez, Terä svirta, and van Dijk, which contains additional details.
After a Taylor series approximation, the model becomes
where x it ¼ ð f ðp it Þ; X it Þ and the vector parameter b 1 * is a multiple of g*. Testing g* ¼ 0 is then equivalent to testing that b 1 * 0 ¼ 0. Under the null hypothesis, 1 it * ¼ 1 it , which implies that the Taylor series approximation does 10. Equations (1) and (2) 
whereX i is the vector x it for country i in equation (A3) (after the fixed effects demeaning transformation), and k is the number of explanatory variables in the linear model. Under the null hypothesis LM x is asymptotically distributed as x 2 (k). The test of remaining heterogeneity proposed by Gonzá lez, Terä svirta, and van Dijk (2005) was also computed. The test is based on the same principles as the test described above. The null hypothesis is now that the LSTR model with one transition is appropriate, and the LM statistics tests whether an additional element, b
